sexta-feira, 16 de setembro de 2011

Deliberate River-Crossing Operations


Deliberate River-Crossing Operations: Focus on the Fundamentals

by Miroslav P. Kurka, Brian Dosa


Combined-arms river crossings are complicated and difficult operations that require the commitment of substantial resources and a high degree of synchronization to be successful. This may be one of the reasons that maneuver forces infrequently train for river-crossing operations.
During its recent Warfighter Exercise, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD)--with operational control of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat)--planned and executed a deliberate river crossing in a Korean scenario. In the process, both units thoroughly reviewed river-crossing doctrine as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 90-13, River-Crossing Operations, and developed useful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for executing and controlling division river-crossing operations. In the process, the lCD combined-arms team reaffirmed the importance of the river-crossing fundamentals.
Preparation
The lCD began preparing for the river crossing in early November 1999 during its Warfighter Seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A major focus of this seminar was a doctrinal discussion of river-crossing operations by the division commanders and battlefield-operating-system chiefs. Additionally, the assistant division engineer, lCD Engineer Brigade S3, and the 937th Engineer Group S3 compared and synchronized the tools that the division and group would use to plan and control the crossing operation. Foremost among these tools was a simple matrix (Figure 1) for tracking the progress of the crossing at each site.
In addition to tracking planned and actual crossing times, the matrix allowed the division and group to track the status of key bridging assets at each crossing site. The lCD assistant division engineer developed a simple Microsoft[R] Excel program for calculating the engineer/bridging equipment and forces required to support a crossing operation. This program also calculated crossing times for both rafting and bridging, based on the number of vehicles to be crossed.
In December, the staff of the 937th Engineer Group deployed from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Hood, Texas, to participate in a lCD command post exercise (CPX). Before the CPX began, the 937th's staff conducted professional-development instruction on river-crossing operations by attending the III Corps training exercise "Road Runner 2000." A critical event during this exercise was the deliberate river crossing of Corps assets across Belton Lake, located adjacent to Fort Hood. The 62d Engineer Battalion commander and crossing force engineer (CFE) instructed the 937th's staff in the crossing area. Group officers conducted a terrain walk of the staging area, call-forward area, and engineer equipment park. The 74th Engineer Company (Multirole Bridge Company) emplaced the 120-meter assault-float ribbon bridge, and members of the 937th were able to walk across the bridge and learn the proper techniques of proofing the bridge before actually crossing as part of III Corps.
This river-crossing exercise provided excellent situational awareness for the 937th's staff and significantly enhanced their ability to plan and execute river crossings. During the December CPX, the lCD and 937th planned a deliberate river-crossing operation. This crossing was not actually executed because the crossing force was able to execute a hasty crossing using numerous ford sites. Despite this, the exercise provided valuable training for the staffs of the 1CD, the Engineer Brigade, and the 937th on river-crossing planning.
The 937th's headquarters returned to Fort Hood in late January 2000 for the lCD Warfighter ramp-up CPX. During this exercise, the LCD and the 937th conducted detailed planning for a deliberate crossing of the Yesong River in Korea, but once again did not execute a deliberate crossing. The opposing force (OPFOR) failed to destroy the bridge over the Yesong River, and the LCD was able to cross the river over existing bridges. The division would not be so lucky when fighting the "world-class" OPFOR.
Planning and Rehearsals
On 22 February 2000, the 937th Engineer Group deployed to Fort Hood for the third and final time to support the 1CD during its Warfighter Exercise. Training objectives for this exercise were focused on the integration of the 937th into the lCD, the development of plans and orders to fight in a Korean scenario, and command and control of engineers in support of a deliberate river crossing. The 1CD Warfighter scenario had the division attacking north into "Orangeland" on the Korean peninsula as the supporting effort of the U.S. III Corps. A major obstacle in the 1CD's zone was the Yesong River, which was 200 to 240 meters wide and fordable only in the eastern 25 percent of the division's zone. To support a deliberate crossing of the Yesong, III Corps allocated the 937th Engineer Group two corps combat-engineer battalions (one wheeled and one mechanized) and four bridge companies (one assault-float-bridge company and three multirole bridge companies) to the 1CD.
Using terrain products provided by the lCD's terrain team, the assistant division engineer identified 14 potential crossing sites over the Yesong River in the lCD attack zone: four fords, four fixed-bridge sites, two assault-float-bridge sites, and four rafting sites. The Yesong crossing sites are shown in Figure 2, page 30.
Working with the battle staff, the assistant division engineer developed a synchronized deliberate river-crossing plan with two crossing areas-the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) in the west and the 1BCT in the east. The division maneuver and fire-support plan detailed all four phases of the river crossing:
* Phase I. Advance to the river.
* Phase II. Assault across the river.
* Phase III. Advance from the exit bank.
* Phase IV. Secure the bridgehead line.
Although the lCD's engineer plan also focused on all four phases of the crossing, the division's river-crossing annex focused only on the first three phases. The plan called for two bridging sites--Arapaho in the west and Ottawa in the east. Because ford sites were located in the east, the 1BCT would conduct its assault crossing (Phase II) over the fords and secure both the near and far shores with heavy maneuver forces before commencing bridging operations at the Ottawa crossing site. Therefore, no rafting was planned at Ottawa. No ford sites were available in the 2BCT zone of attack, and the division planned to conduct the assault phase at the Arapaho crossing site using dismounted infantry in 15-person rubber boats (RB-15s). After securing the far shore from direct fire, engineers would construct rafts and raft a mechanized task force across the Yesong to build combat power, allow the 2BCT to eliminate observed indirect fire, and then allow the 937th to construct bridges. The 1CD designated the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M) as the crossing-force commander and the 937th commander as the crossing-force engineer. Figure 3 shows a sketch of the crossing plan.
Also located in the 2BCT zone of attack was the Kaw crossing site, an existing fixed bridge over the Yesong River Dam. If Orangeland forces destroyed the dam, the river would drain and become fordable in several locations. If it wasn't severely damaged or destroyed, it provided a high-speed crossing. Thus, it was expected that Orangeland forces would attempt to damage, but not destroy, the dam and use chemicals to prevent the 1CD from using it. The division commander directed that the 937th be prepared to repair the roadway of the Kaw Dam.
After receiving the 1CD operations order, the 937th began to develop a detailed crossing plan to support the maneuver plan. Using the military decision-making process outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, the 937th's staff analyzed the mission, developed courses of action, conducted war gaming, and then compared courses of action. During its planning, the staff worked closely with the assistant division engineer and the 1CD Engineer Brigade staff. During its intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the 937th identified an additional crossing site just south of the Kaw Dam. Based on satellite imagery, it appeared to be a ford site. The 1CD Cavalry Squadron (1-7 Cavalry) was given the mission to reconnoiter this site. The 937th's plan refined and completed the initial division-crossing plan and was incorporated into the overall plan.